ERISA Preemption of State Tort Law Claims Against Managed Care Entities by Schuch, John W.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 67
Issue 4
SYMPOSIUM:
Cognitive Legal Studies: Categorization and
Imagination in the Mind of Law. A Conference in
Celebration of the Publication of Steven L. Winter's
Book, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind
Article 12
3-1-2002
ERISA Preemption of State Tort Law Claims
Against Managed Care Entities
John W. Schuch
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
John W. Schuch, ERISA Preemption of State Tort Law Claims Against Managed Care Entities, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 1221 (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol67/iss4/12
NOTE
ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW
CLAIMS AGAINST MANAGED CARE ENTITIES*
INTRODUCTION
The recent proliferation of managed health care has
dramatically affected the way most Americans receive their
health care benefits.' At the heart of every managed care
insurance plan is an emphasis on cost containment.2 As a
result, many patients have suffered poor health consequences
because of decisions by managed care insurers to deny
requested benefits.
Given the widespread use and effect managed care has
had on health care, a health maintenance organization
©2002 John W. Schuch. All Rights Reserved.
The number of Americans using managed care plans is rapidly growing. A
recent count estimated approximately one hundred million Americans are enrolled in
some kind of managed care plan and the percentage of insured employees (working in
firms with at least ten employees) with managed care plans was sixty-six percent.
Saeid B. Aminib, Discrimination of International Medical Graduate Physicians by
Managed Care Organizations: Impact, Law, and Remedy, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 461, n.63 (1999).
2 The majority of managed care insurers have elements of quality and cost
control systems that include practice reviews, guidelines, and advanced control over
actual utilization of benefits by both providers and patients. RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET
AL., LAW AND THE AIERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 20 (1997); Diana Joseph Bearden,
Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285,
294 (1995); Bryce A. Jensen, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond: A Critique of
Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1344, 1349-50 (2001);
Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standards of Care, 29 J.L. MED &
ETHICS 323, 325 (2001); Jefferey Rugg, An Old Solution to a New Problem: Physician
Unions Take the Edge OffManaged Care, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7 (2000).
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("HMO") or managed care organization ("MCO) 3 that is
negligent in its delivery of health care to its policyholders
should be held accountable for its actions. The most effective
means of accomplishing this accountability is through state
tort law claims.4 However, in order for a plaintiff to maintain a
tort law claim against an HMO, the claim must withstand the
defense of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA") preemption.5 Almost all MCOs are governed by
ERISA when their plans are offered by an employer to an
employee, and § 514 of ERISA preempts "any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan" that is governed by ERISA."' Since the
Supreme Court has yet to face the question of ERISA
preemption of a state tort law claims against an HMO, it is
important to analyze how the Court should treat such an issue
if raised in the future.
This Note will discuss two main reasons why the
Supreme Court should allow state tort law claims against
HMOs to survive ERISA preemption. First, a recent trilogy of
Supreme Court cases has begun to narrow the doctrine of
ERISA preemption. In addition, the Court should analyze how
lower courts have scrutinized the issue of ERISA preemption of
state tort law claims against HMOs, and follow the reasoning
of the Fifth Circuit which allowed claims to stand.
Second, the Court should view ERISA preemption of
state tort law claims against HMOs in light of its treatment of
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act's
("FCIAA")' preemption claims of breach of express warranty
3 Throughout this Note the terms HMO and MCO will be used inter-
changeably to refer to entities offering health insurance plans while maintaining some
level of health care control with an emphasis on cost containment.
4 See infra Part II.B. (illustrating the ineffective remedies under ERISA for
claims of MCO negligence).
6 88 Stat. 829 (1974), (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1988)).
Employer sponsored benefit plans offered by governmental entities, churches, and
plans established solely to comply with workers' compensation' or unemployment
compensation laws are excluded from ERISA regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 1003. I am
assuming for the purposes of this note that the managed care entities discussed are
governed by ERISA.-
6 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
7 Advertising in the tobacco industry is governed by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982) [hereinafter
FCLAAI. The Act's preemption provision states:
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against the tobacco industry. FCLAA preemption is a useful
guide for analyzing ERISA preemption because of the
similarities between the tobacco industry and managed care
entities. First, the decisions of both industries can have a
marked affect on people's health. MCOs' decisions regarding
the provision of benefits can result in policyholders not
receiving necessary medical treatment. Likewise, given the
negative effect of smoking on people's health, the tobacco
industry's decisions also have a significant effect on individual
health. In addition, both industries are governed by federal
statutes which were enacted for similar purposes. Both ERISA
and the FCLAA were enacted to reflect a balance between the
regulation of major U.S. industries while promoting economic
growth. Thus, the Court's treatment of FCLAA preemption
should be used to view ERISA preemption of state law tort
claims against MCOs.
Part I of this Note will trace the rise of managed care in
the United States and illustrate its effect on the American
health care system. Part II.A traces the Supreme Court's
recent trend of narrowing the doctrine of ERISA preemption.
Part II.B argues that a state tort law claim against an HMO
for negligently adopting a benefits policy can help effectively
ensure the quality of care in managed care. Part III.A argues
that the Supreme Court's treatment of FCLAA preemption
should be a guide to analyzing ERISA preemption because of
the similarities between the tobacco industry and managed
care entities, the similar objectives of the FCLAA and ERISA,
and the fact that the Supreme Court has yet to face the issue of
a MCO's liability for a common law tort claim. Part III.B
analyzes the Court's treatment of FCLAA preemption of a
claim of breach of express warranty against the tobacco
industry and argues that the Court's analysis is a useful guide
to analyze negligent adoption of a benefits policy by an HMO.
(a) no statement relating to smoking and health, other than that
which is required by section 133 of this title, shall be required on any
cigarette package.
(b) no requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1334.
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In conclusion, given the Supreme Court's narrowing of ERISA
preemption, the lower courts' treatment of state tort law claims
against MCOs, and the Court's treatment of FCLAA
preemption of breach of express warranty against the tobacco
industry, the Court should allow state tort law claims against
HMOs to survive ERISA preemption.
I. THE RISE OF MANAGED CARE
Before the 1930s, patients paid directly for medical
services under the traditional American health care system.
But after the Great Depression drastically lowered middle
class incomes, America's traditional health care payment
system was undermined.' Since patients were no longer able to
pay physicians directly, health care costs needed to be spread
over a large number of people.9 Thus, the rise of private health
insurance was inevitable.
Indemnity benefit plans were the predominant form of
early private health insurance." Although the middle and
upper classes enjoyed a host of benefits under these plans, the
non-working class was largely left uninsured." In the 1960s,
the absence of health benefits for the growing number of
8 ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH
CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §1.02(2) (2002); David D.
Griner, Paying the Piper: Third Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment Decisions,
25 GA. L. REV. 861, 874 (1991).
9 ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
'
0 Id. at 9. Indemnity benefit plans are ones in which patients pay their health
care provider for services rendered and then seeks reimbursement from their
insurance company. Under these plans, patients have their choice of health care
providers, the plan pays for full service or a portion thereof, and the insurance
company has no other relationship to the provider. Id.
" Id. at 10-11. The middle and upper classes were able to purchase indemnity
health insurance such as Blue Cross Blue Shield and many employers began offering
health insurance plans as an alternative to wage increases. Id. at 11. This resulted in a
rise of private health insurance from 50.3% of the total population insured privately in
1950 to 81.1% of the total population insured privately in 1980. ROSENBLATT ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 12 (citing Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and
Costs: Historical Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141,
144, tbl. 2 (1993), reprinted with permission from the American Society of Law,
Medicine & Ethics; drawing on Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book
of Health Insurance Data, Washington, DC: HIAA, 25, tbl. 2.2 (1992)); Department of
Commerce Statistical Abstract of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 8 tbl. 2 (1992).
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elderly people created a powerful political group which, in part,
resulted in the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.12
This federal legislation coupled with advances in expensive
health care technology led to an enormous rise in national
health care spending. 3 This set the stage for the emergence of
managed care.
Managed care is a framework of financing and
organizing health care.' The goal of managed care is to
decrease costs by exercising more direct control over the
provision of health care."6 Although managed care may have
been a necessary response to the increase in health care
spending, it has significantly affected individual health care.
For example, in a managed care system a patient seeking
health care usually is limited to a select number of
participating physicians. 6 Almost all MCOs today limit a
patient's use of doctors to a selected group of physicians called
participating physicians/providers. Although some MCOs do
give patients the option to use a physician of their own choice,
this option usually results in a penalty of higher prices to the
insured. Additionally, in most MCOs, the participating
physician agrees to follow certain treatment guidelines adopted
by the MCO.'7 These guidelines are established in order to try
12 ROSENBLATW ET AL., supra note 2, at 14, FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 8, at
§102(2). Medicare, Title 18 of the Social Security Act, provides federal hospitalization
and medical coverage for persons over sixty-five and Medicaid, Title 19 of the Social
Security Act, provides federal matching funds for state medical assistance programs
for the poor.
13 ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 2, at 16-17. In 1960 the health care share of
the Gross National Product ("GNP") was 5.3% while in 1990 it rose to 12.2%. Id. at 17,
tbl. 2 (citing Bovbjerg et al., supra note 11, at 142, tbl. 1); Sally T. Burner et al.,
National Health Expenditures Projections through 2030, 14 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV. 1, tbls. 3, 4, and 7 (1992).
14 ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 2, at 19; Jensen, supra note 2, at 1349-50;
Vickie Yates Brown, Managed Care at the Crossroads: Can Managed Care
Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 27-28 (1998);
Bearden, supra note 2, at 289.
15 ROSENBLATTr ET AL., supra note 2, at 20. The function of insurance and
delivery of health services are integrated into a single corporate entity that both
insures groups and delivers covered benefits through a defined network of
participating providers. Id at 19.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 20; Susan 0. Scheutzow, A Framework for Analysis of ERISA
Preemption in Suits Against Health Plans and a Call for Reform, 11 J. L. & HEALTH
195, 200 (1996-97); James A. Duffy, HMO Doctors as ERISA Fiduciaries: A Bankruptcy
Perspective, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 125, 128-29 (2000).
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to contain treatment costs. The guidelines usually set the
appropriate medical treatment based on the patient's
diagnosis. Physicians are usually contractually bound to follow
these guidelines and thus must seek approval from the MCO if
a different course of treatment is believed to be necessary.
Thus, individual health care in a managed care system is
affected by giving the patient limited options in physician
selection and requiring physicians to follow cost-containing
guidelines. Since managed care is on the rise,18 this effect is a
concern for many Americans.
II. ERISA PREEMPTION
A. Supreme Court's Narrowing of ERISA Preemption
Congress enacted ERISA primarily to protect
employees' pensions.19 Congress was concerned with a system
of unregulated employee pensions which often resulted in
persistent underfunding. If major industries went into
economic decline, such as the railroads in the 1930s and the
automobile and steel industries in the 1960s and 1970s, many
companies would not be able to pay promised pensions. In
addition, pre-ERISA pension plan assets were supposed to be
administered in trust for the benefit of employees, but because
of the lack of effective state and federal law remedies, many
pension assets were being utilized to benefit companies. This
problem affected health benefits as well as pension plans."
The percentage of the American population covered by private indemnity
health insurance has fallen for the first time in fifty years, from 81.1 % in 1980 to
71.6% in 1990. ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 2, at 20. This drop in coverage has been
caused by a combination of corporate layoffs and a shift to part time workers without
benefits, a growing number of companies dropping health care benefits, the rising cost
of individual policies, and the insurance companies' attempt to cut costs by excluding
people with certain pre-existing conditions. Id.
19 Id. at 159; Duffy, supra note 17, at 132; Bryron Done, Health Care Reform
and ERISA Preemption: Can the States Adopt Aspects of Germany's Health Care
System to Achieve Universal Access and Cost Containment?, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 745, 757-58 (1995).
20 ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 2, at 159.
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ERISA has also had a marked effect on health
insurance. Since ERISA applies to an employee benefit plan
maintained by "any employer engaged in commerce,"2 1 it
reaches almost all private employers who provide health
insurance for their employees. Thus, ERISA affects many
Americans' health insurance plans.
ERISA affects health insurance plans in two major
ways. First, § 514(a) contains one of the most sweeping
provisions preempting state law ever enacted in a federal
statute,' and the ERISA remedies provision, § 502, has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as preempting any claim
under an ERISA plan that falls within the scope of the
remedies provision.' Second, ERISA's remedies are
significantly more limited than remedies available under state
laws.' As a result, ERISA has been interpreted as preempting
much of state contract, insurance, and tort law which has left
many employees and their families without adequate redress
for perceived wrongdoing.'
In accordance with Supreme Court precedent stating
that a federal law's preemptive control must be interpreted to
reflect Congress' intent in enacting that statute,6 ERISA
preemption under § 514 has been interpreted broadly to follow
Congress' intent to provide uniform regulation and supervision
of employee benefit plans. The statute provides that ERISA
"shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they ...
relate to any employee benefit plan."27 In Shaw v. Delta Air
21 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1).
ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 2, at 160.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding Congress
intended ERISA's civil enforcement scheme to be the exclusive remedies available to
ERISA beneficiaries).
24 ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 2, at 161. See infra Section II.B. discussing
the inadequacies of ERISA remedies.2 ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 2, at 160-61. For example, once a court has
found a tort claim against an MCO preempted, claimants must pursue their grievance
under ERISA's civil remedies provisions. Although one provision allows claimants to
enforce benefits due under the plan, this is an inadequate remedy for a claimant who
has already been injured by the denial of such benefit.
26 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519
(1977).
27 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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Lines, Inc.," the Supreme Court set forth the sweeping effect of
ERISA preemption. The plaintiff employers challenged two
New York state laws, as being preempted by ERISA, that dealt
with discrimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of
pregnancy and the provision of sick-leave benefits to pregnant
employees." The Court stated that the issue with ERISA
preemption is whether the state laws "relate to" employee
benefit plans subject to ERISA regulation." The Court defined
"relate to" broadly, holding that "a law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan."31 In support of this
broad interpretation, the Court referred to the legislative
history of ERISA."2 The Court observed that the bill originally
contained a more limited preemption clause but Congress had
chosen instead to adopt the present language to avoid the
threat of conflicting and inconsistent state laws.3 Therefore,
28 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
'Id. at 88.
30 Id. at 96. ERISA § 514(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this title and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b). The term
"State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law, of any State. The term "State"
includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or
instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or
indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered
by this title.
29 U.S.C. § 514(c)(1)-(2).
" Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
32 Id. at 98-99.
3Id. Statements by the bill's sponsors stressed the breadth of federal
preemption. Representative Dent stated:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority
the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans. With the
preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded
participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent
State and local regulation.
120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (quoted in Shaw, 463 U.S. at 99). Senator Williams
echoed these sentiments:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the
bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations,
thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended
[Vol. 67: 41228
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the Supreme Court initially embraced a broad ERISA
preemptive effect because of its interpretation of Congress'
intent.
However, in a recent trilogy of cases, the Supreme
Court has retreated from such a broad reading of "relate to"
and has thus narrowed ERISA's preemptive effect.34 First, in
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., the Supreme Court held that a New York
statute imposing surcharges on hospital rates for patients
covered by a commercial insurer did not "relate to" employee
benefit plans under ERISA and thus was not preempted. 5 In
analyzing the preemption challenge, the Court stated that "[ilf
'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption
would never run its course.36 Rather than using a specific
definition of "relate to," the Travelers Court looked to the
objectives of ERISA to define the scope of the state law that
would survive preemption.' Again, the Court stated that
Congress' intent in enacting ERISA was to establish a uniform
body of benefits law3" in order to minimize the burdens of
complying with conflicting state regulations.39 The Court then
found that the surcharges only imposed an indirect economic
influence on the administrators of commercial insurers by
increasing hospital costs, but did not bind them to any
to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local
governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or
effect of law.
Id. at 29,933 (quoted in Shaw, 463 U.S. at 99).
3De Bouno v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997);
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., 519 U.S. 316
(1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers]; see also Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex.
Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing the trilogy of Supreme Court
preemption cases).
35 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-68.
" Id. at 655.
37 Id. at 656. The Travelers Court specifically stated that the definition
of "connection with" set out in Shaw and the "relate to" text of the ERISA statute
would be unhelpful in defining the key term. Id.
38 Benefits laws are state and federal laws that govern the management of
benefits gained by employees through their employment.
"9 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
133, 142 (1990)).
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particular choice of administration.0 Such an indirect economic
influence did not preclude a health insurer from offering a
uniform interstate benefit package to employers because an
insurer offering health plans to employers in different states,
including New York, could still establish one plan. The statute
would only affect the cost of the plan to employers in New
York. The insurer could still offer the same plan, albeit at a
higher cost, outside New York state.4' The Court realized that
if ERISA's preemptive clause was read too broadly, it would
supercede all state laws affecting the cost of health insurance
on the theory that those state laws indirectly relate to ERISA
plans.42 This broad reading would eliminate the limiting
provision of "relate to."43
Although the Court states that a uniform interstate
benefits plan is possible, the Court disregards one of the
objectives of ERISA mentioned earlier in the opinion-
minimizing the "financial burden of complying with conflicting
directives among States."" A New York commercial insurance
plan will inevitably have to charge its policyholders a higher
premium given the hospital surcharge. If a New York
commercial insurer wishes to provide an interstate-uniform
policy, policyholders in all other states now face a higher
premium because of the New York surcharges. Although New
York voters may have supported the surcharges, policyholders
in all other states with New York commercial carriers are now
subject to its effects. As a result of unwarranted premium
increases, many policyholders may elect to pursue intrastate
insurers who would not be subjected to premium increases
resulting from the New York surcharges. Thus, an interstate
commercial insurer is facing a financial burden through
conflicting state laws-one of the objectives that Congress
sought to minimize by enacting ERISA.
The second Supreme Court case in the trilogy is
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc."' The plaintiff challenged
40 Id. at 659.
"'
1 Id. at 660.
41 Id. at 661.
4 3 Id.
"Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (quoting McClendon, 498 U.S. at 142).
45 519 U.S. 316.
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California's prevailing wage law,46 which required a contractor
on a public works project to pay its workers the prevailing
wage, with an exception that permitted a contractor to pay a
lower wage to workers participating in a state-approved
apprenticeship program.47  The issue was whether the
preemption provision of ERISA supercedes the California law
in that the law prohibits payment of the apprentice wage to an
apprentice trained in an unapproved program. The Court found
that the prevailing wage statute did not bind ERISA plans, but
provided economic incentive to comport with State
requirements. 8 Since no apprentice program is required to
meet California standards, the economic incentive to comport
with State requirements is that conforming apprentice
programs can provide apprentices who can work at a lower
wage. The Court concluded that the relationship between the
California law and ERISA plans was too tenuous to allow
ERISA preemption.4 ' Again, the Court recognized the need for
some limits to ERISA preemption of state laws.
The final case in the trilogy is De Buono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical and Clinical Services Fund.5" The Court held that New
York's gross receipt tax on the income of medical centers
operated by ERISA funds was not preempted.5' Respondents,
trustees of a medical fund which administers a welfare benefit
plan, brought the action to enjoin future tax assessments. 2
Specifically, since the New York law taxed the income of
medical centers, and respondents operated a medical center
funded exclusively from funds generated from an employee
benefit plan, the respondents alleged that the New York tax
assessment is a state law that "relates to" a benefit plan under
ERISA and is therefore preempted." The Court started its
analysis by noting that the traditional police powers of the
State include regulation of health and safety.' 4 In addition, the
Court operated under a presumption that Congress did not
CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 1771 (West 1989).47 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 319.
'Id. at 332.
4
'Id. at 334.
so 520 U.S. 806.
1Id. at 809.
2Id. at 810.
3 Id.
' Id. at 814.
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intend to supersede state law.55 Thus, the Court concluded that
respondents have a considerable burden to overcome.56 The
Court found that although the tax assessment imposes some
burden on the administration of ERISA plans because any law
that increases the cost of providing benefits to employees will
have an effect on administration, that is not enough to render
the state law preempted." Here, as in Travelers, the Court
seems to depreciate one of Congress' objectives in enacting
ERISA-minimizing the burden on the administration of
ERISA plans. An ERISA plan set up as a trust fund to
administer health care would certainly be burdened by the
imposition of a gross income tax. Nonetheless, the Court still
found that this does not relate to ERISA plans within the
meaning of the statute."8 Therefore, from this trilogy of recent
Supreme Court decisions it is evident that the Court has
narrowed ERISA's § 514 preemption of state laws.
B. ERISA Preemption of State Tort Law Claims Against
HMOs
As health care costs continue to grow in the United
States, so will managed care and its emphasis on cost
containment. When a health care provider and/or
administrator has such a goal, it often jeopardizes the quality
of care. Therefore, it is important that MCOs are not permitted
to sacrifice quality health care for profit. One way to help
ensure quality health care is to attach civil liability for
negligent decision making by MCO. However, the doctrine of
preemption poses a significant threat to the success of
plaintiffs because of the significant difference between the
damages recoverable in a state common law action and an
action under ERISA.59 Although the above trilogy illustrates
the Court's trend toward narrowing ERISA's § 514 preemption,
the Supreme Court has yet to address the question of ERISA
55 De Buono, 520 U.S. at 813.
" Id. at 814.
57 Id.
" Id. at 816.
59 See JOHN K. DIMUGNO & PAUL E.B. GLAD, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE
HANDBOOK § 29.01 (2000).
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preemption of state common law claims against MCOs. A MCO
facing a tort action will likely assert that the claim seeks to
recover benefits due under an ERISA plan. Since ERISA § 502
encompasses such an action, it may be preempted.
Section 502 of ERISA provides for six types of civil
actions that may be brought to enforce the Act."0 Although
there are a "wide array of measures"6' for ERISA participants
to enforce their rights under a plan, none of these measures
provide for extra-contractual damages. The Supreme Court in
both Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russel2 and
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates' limited a claimant's recovery to
policy proceeds.' For example, in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance, the Court held that a claimant suing under ERISA
could not recover extra-contractual or punitive damages for
improper benefits claim processing.' These decisions
Section 502(a) in full reads:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection Cc) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate
relief in the case of a violation of [section] 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by
the Secretary to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this subchapter, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2)
or Ci) or (I) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988).
61 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russel, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (citing as examples, an action to recover benefits due, enforce rights under
a plan, or clarify future benefits under plan terms).
6 473 U.S. at 148.
508 U.S. 248 (1993).
64 See DIMUGNO & GLAD, supra note 58.
65 473 U.S. at 148.
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effectively foreclose the possibility of extra-contractual
remedies under ERISA .
As a result of these limited remedy provisions, insurers
offering ERISA health plans have a perverse incentive to deny
coverage or adopt policies limiting coverage. For example, since
recovery under ERISA is constrained to the benefits contract,
claimants are limited to enforcing rights that are specially
provided under their plan. This allows an HMO to greatly limit
the relief claimants may seek by drafting plans that establish
guidelines and/or policies limiting the medical treatments that
the entity will reimburse. If a coverage decision or policy is at
minimum questionable, then an HMO committed to contain
costs may deny the claim or adopt the policy without the fear of
liability for tort damages. 7 Since a claimant can only recover
under the contract, an HMO would only be responsible for the
cost of the medical treatment that it refused to reimburse. In
this way an HMO really cannot lose by initially limiting
treatments because the HMO can only be held liable for
medical care sought. If policyholders' common law tort claims
were preempted by § 504 of ERISA, recovery for injuries
resulting from a denial of benefits or the negligent adoption of
a policy limiting treatment would be greatly diminished. Thus,
the one means to effectively protect a patient from the direct
negligence of HMOs is to allow patients to bring state tort law
direct liability claims against HMOs for their negligence.
In a series of cases, the Third Circuit has offered a
glimmer of hope to the dilemma faced by HMO beneficiaries
seeking to hold HMOs accountable. First, in Dukes v. U.S.
See DIMUGNO & GLAD, supra note 58.
It seems likely that an HMO offering a plan under ERISA would not deny
all questionable claims because of market competition. Although all HMOs emphasize
cost-cutting techniques and profit, an HMO that denied too many questionable claims
would certainly upset policyholders. Such dissatisfaction would likely cause the
employer to offer another insurer or encourage policyholders to switch to another plan
if multiple plans were offered. These market factors would likely curb some
unwarranted denials, but not all.Section 503 of ERISA does provide that the court may award the claimant
attorney's fees but this is much less threatening than facing a potential jury verdict for
a tort claim. 29 U.S.C. §1132 (g)(1). In addition, the court is not required to award
attorney's fees at all. Even if attorney's fees were awarded, the number of claimants
who would hire an attorney to sue an HMO with only the hope of recovering the cost of
treatment and the possibility of an attorney fee award would surely be small.
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Healthcare Inc.,69 the plaintiffs sued U.S. Healthcare, their
HMO, for medical malpractice. In the first action, plaintiff
Celicia Dukes brought a medical malpractice action under
Pennsylvania state law's ostensible agency theory because her
husband Darryl died after a hospital refused to perform a
physician-ordered blood test. ' In the second action, plaintiffs
Ronald and Linda Visconti alleged that Linda's treating
physician ignored her symptoms of preeclampsia, which led to
the stillbirth of their child.' They sued U.S. Healthcare under
direct negligence theory claiming that the HMO was negligent
in the selection and supervision of their physician. 2 The court
drew an important distinction between seeking recovery for
benefits denied under an ERISA plan and claiming damages
for the poor quality of care received. 3 The court concluded that
both plaintiffs were claiming the latter, for which an HMO may
be liable under agency or negligence principles.74 The Third
Circuit reasoned that § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA does not mention
anything concerning the quality of benefits received. 5 Thus,
the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by ERISA as seeking
to enforce an ERISA remedy. 6
In the second case, In re U.S. Healthcare Inc.,77 the
plaintiff brought a state medical malpractice claim against her
HMO, U.S. Healthcare, alleging direct and vicarious liability.7"
The claim was for damages arising from the death of the
plaintiff's newborn baby. 9 The complaint alleged that after the
plaintiff gave birth, Dr. Nemeh 0 discharged the mother and
child after twenty-four hours under the HMO's pre-certification
57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
7oId. at 352.
1d at 353.
" Id.
" Id. at 356-57.
74 Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
75 Id.
"6 Id.
7 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
78 Id. at 155. The plaintiffs also named as defendants: Kamilah Nemeh, M.D.,
the treating pediatrician, Kennedy Hospital, the hospital where the plaintiffs child
was born, and The Health Maintenance Organization of New Jersey, Inc., a subsidiary
of U.S. Healthcare, Inc. Id.
79Id.
8Dr. Nemeh is an independent health care provider contracting with U.S.
Healthcare. Id. at 156.
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discharge policy for newborns.81 This policy required that
newborns be discharged twenty-four hours after birth unless
the treating physician obtained approval (pre-certification)
from the provider for a longer stay. One day post-discharge, the
plaintiff noticed that the baby was ill and contacted Dr.
Nemeh, who did not advise her to bring the baby back to the
hospital.82 The plaintiff also contacted U.S. Healthcare and
requested an in-home visit by a pediatric nurse, which was not
provided. The plaintiffs child had contracted an undiagnosed
strep infection that developed into meningitis; the baby died
that same day.83
The plaintiffs complaints against U.S. Healthcare
included direct liability for their adoption of the twenty-four
hour, pre-certification discharge policy. U.S Healthcare
contended that these claims were preempted by ERISA in that
they sought recovery under state law for a denial of benefits
under an ERISA plan. Following their previous decision in
Dukes, the Third Circuit noted the distinction between claims
directed to the quality of benefits provided, which are not
preempted, and claims that a plan erroneously withheld
benefits, which are completely preempted by ERISA.' In
addition, the court distinguished between an HMO that acts
solely as a benefits administrator and an HMO that acts as a
health care provider by arranging for and providing medical
treatment.86 The Court held that the HMO's activity as a
health care provider subjected the HMO to a state's standard of
care. Because the court found that the defendant HMO
81 U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 156.
82 Id.
83 Id.
Id. at 156-57. Count One alleges that the policy "encouraged, pressured,
and/or directly or indirectly required" the twenty-four hour pre-certification discharge
used by the doctor and hospital. Id. at 156 (citation omitted). Count One also include a
claim against U.S. Healthcare for vicarious liability for the negligence of its alleged
agents Dr. Nemeh and Kennedy Hospital in their premature discharge of the newborn.
U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 156. Count Five alleges that U.S. Healthcare negligently
adopted the policy of hospital utilization that discouraged physicians from admitting
infants after the discharge. Id. 157. Count Six alleges that after the discharge, the
infant's condition required a home visit by a pediatric nurse. Id.
&5 Id. at 161-62. Once an action is completely preempted by ERISA, a claimant
can only seek relief under the benefits contract.
8'Id. at 162.
87 U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 162.
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essentially made a medical determination of the appropriate
level of care when it adopted the twenty-four hour discharge
policy," the Court. held that this was a claim involving the
quality of care, which was not preempted by ERISA."9
In 2000, the Third Circuit reinforced the distinction
between actions relating to the quality of care given and those
involving claims for denying benefits. In Lazorko v.
Pennsylvania Hospital,9" Jonathon Lazorko alleged that the
HMO U.S. Healthcare was directly and vicariously liable under
state law for his wife's death. Lazorko claimed that the HMO
imposed financial disincentives on his wife's physician which
discouraged the doctor from recommending additional
necessary treatment.9' In holding that these claims were not
preempted by ERISA, the court reasoned that challenging an
HMO's financial incentive structure could relate to "the
soundness of a medical decision by a health care provider
rather than the administration of benefits under an ERISA
plan."92 As such, decisions to deny a request for additional
treatment could be a claim about the quality of care given
rather than the quantity of health benefits provided.93
The Third Circuit has recognized the need for holding
HMOs accountable under state law. Giving a beneficiary a
cause of action for challenging either the quality of benefits
received or an HMO policy enables policyholders to seek
recovery for HMO negligence and provides sound HMO
regulation. Facing potential liability for policy decisions will
certainly cause HMOs to more carefully research guidelines
and benefits offered. Although pre-certification guidelines are
an important tool to help contain the cost of health care, it is
imperative that these guidelines are thoroughly researched to
maintain high-quality health care delivery. The Third Circuit's
decisions in Dukes, U.S Healthcare, and Lazorko reflect a
sensible balance between cost containment while allowing
individuals a viable state law remedy.94
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163.
"237 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2000).
"Id. at 246.
Id. at 249.
9Id.
"The Third Circuit in Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266 (3d
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However, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have
been less willing to allow tort law claims to proceed against
HMOs. The Fifth Circuit, in Corcoran v. United Healthcare,
Inc.,95 held that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs wrongful
death claim against her HMO, U.S. Healthcare. 9 Plaintiff sued
her HMO when she was denied temporary disability benefits.'
Although her treating physician ordered complete bed rest for
the remainder of her pregnancy, instead of providing
hospitalization in accordance with the treating physician's
order,98 U.S. Healthcare only authorized in-home nursing care
for ten hours per day.99 During a period without nursing care,
the plaintiffs fetus went into distress and died.00 The court
reasoned that even though U.S. Healthcare was making a
medical decision concerning the plaintiffs health care, this
decision had been made in the context of determining benefits
under an ERISA plan.0" Therefore, ERISA preempted her
wrongful death claim.0 2
In Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
also held that ERISA preempted a state law claim for wrongful
death based on an HMO's denial of benefits. 0 3 In Tolton, the
administrator of the deceased patient's estate brought a
wrongful death action against the decedent's HMO.' The
decedent sought treatment from the HMO's psychologist on
numerous occasions for his suicidal thoughts, but the HMO
denied psychiatric benefits.0 5 The decedent later committed
suicide."° The court found that because the wrongful death
Cir. 2001), recently used the quality/quantity approach and found that a challenge to
an HMO's delay in the approval of a health treatment was preempted by ERISA. The
court reasoned that underlying the delay was the HMO's decision to require
beneficiaries to seek approval of out of network physicians. Id. at 273. This HMO policy
related to the administration of benefits, rather than the quality of benefits received,
and thus is distinguished from Dukes, U.S. Healthcare, and Lazorko. Id. at 272-73.90 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
96 Id.
" Id. at 1322.
98 Id. at 1322-24.
99 Id. at 1324.
100 Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
101 Id. at 1331.
102 Id.
103 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995).
"" Id at 939.
'5 Id. at 939-40.
" Id. at 940.
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claim arose from the HMO's refusal to provide psychiatric
benefits, the claim "relate[d] to" the benefit plan and was thus
preempted by ERISA. °7
In addition, the Eighth Circuit held in Thompson v.
Gencare Health Systems, Inc... that ERISA preempted
plaintiffs medical malpractice claim against the HMO,
Gencare Health Systems."9 The plaintiff alleged that the HMO
was negligent in its refusal to perform either high-dose
chemotherapy or a bone marrow transplant to treat his wife's
cancer."' The court reasoned that because this claim was a
common law action for failing to provide benefits under an
ERISA plan, it was preempted by ERISA."'
While the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eight
Circuits lead to disquieting results, the Third Circuit's
acceptance of actions challenging an HMO's benefits policy is
the best approach for regulating HMOs. If HMOs faced
potential state tort liability for its policies on benefits
decisions, HMOs would feel compelled to choose their policies
with care and make proper decisions relating to plan benefits.
This would better protect beneficiaries and ensure quality
health care. However, if claims are preempted by ERISA, an
HMO can adopt cost-cutting policies that would deny
potentially necessary medical treatment recommended by a
skilled practitioner. If the recommended treatment is truly
necessary, the HMO can avoid a negligence claim through
ERISA preemption. The beneficiary's sole recourse is the often-
inadequate ERISA civil enforcement provisions. Without a tort
claim challenging HMO policy, beneficiaries are left in a
precarious position-they will either be treated by a thorough,
competent physician whose medical decision may face
administrative denial with little recourse," or have recourse
'07 Id. at 943.
108 202 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2000).
109 Id. at 1073.
"o Id. The action was brought by Linda Thompson's husband.
.Id. at 1073.
11 This is the situation under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits' approach.
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through state tort law but only if their treating physician's
treatment caused the alleged injury."' These are not desirable
alternatives.
Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram v.
Herdich"' lends support to the Third Circuit's reasoning."5
Although Pegram involved the question of when an HMO owes
a fiduciary duty to ERISA plan members, the Court's approach
is useful in the ERISA preemption context. The Supreme Court
distinguished between HMOs making "eligibility decisions,"
which are decisions concerning "the plan's coverage of a
particular condition or medical procedure," and "treatment
decisions," which entail "diagnosing and treating a patient's
condition.""6 The former invokes a fiduciary duty under ERISA
while the latter does not."' This terminology resembles the
Third Circuit's quantity/quality distinction for ERISA
preemption where quantity decisions refer to HMO decisions
determining what benefits are appropriate while quality
decisions refer to an HMO's role in arranging medical
treatment. "Eligibility decisions" involve the coverage decisions
in the administration of an ERISA plan while "treatment
decisions" are more akin to actually providing health care to a
beneficiary. Thus, "eligibility decisions" closely resemble the
Third Circuit's decisions about quantity while "treatment
decisions" are similar to decisions about the quality of medical
care. Just as treatment decisions do not invoke ERISA in the
fiduciary duty context, decisions concerning the quality of
medical care should not invoke ERISA preemption.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should follow the
decisions of the Third Circuit and allow state tort law claims to
survive ERISA preemption that challenge HMO decisions
effecting patient treatment because these claims do not fall
within the remedies of ERISA's § 502.
113 This action would then be against the treating physician for medical
malpractice thus avoiding the problem of ERISA preemption.
114 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
"' See Lazorko, 237 F.3d at 273; Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 273.
.
16 Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2154; Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 273.
117PegraM, 120 S. Ct. at 2155.
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III. FCLAA PREEMPTION AS A GUIDE TO ERISA
PREEMPTION
A. Similarities Between the Tobacco Industry and
Managed Care Entities
Tobacco companies and managed care organizations
share an important similarity in that their actions have a
direct impact on American health. Numerous actions of the
tobacco industry have had a negative impact on public health.
For example, early tobacco advertising campaigns promoted
smoking as a healthy activity' and tobacco manufacturers
include nicotine, an addictive substance, in their products.
Similarly, managed care decisions affect public health. The
denial of claims, the exclusion of certain conditions from
coverage, and the selection of providers directly impact the
course of treatment and thus the health of individuals.
The fact that the decisions of both industries affect
public health should influence a court's acceptance of claims
against the industries for individual harm stemming from such
decisions. Since both industries are aware that their decisions
directly affect public health,"' this awareness should also favor
making these entities accountable for their decisions.
In addition, both the tobacco industry and managed
care organizations are significantly governed by federal
statutes that share similar objectives. ERISA and the FCLAA
are similar because they reflect a balance between industry
regulation and the promotion of economic growth. ERISA was
enacted primarily to protect employees' pensions. 20 The
"a See James C. Thornton, The Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Lung
Cancer: An Analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and
Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76 KY. L.J. 569,
571 (1988).
n9 It is common knowledge today that smoking directly affects individual
health. It is also clear that managed care entities are aware that wrongful denials of
care would adversely affect patient health because given the high cost of health care
today it is unlikely that a patient would be able to pay for the needed treatment that a
managed care organization wrongfully denied authorization for payment.
120 ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 2, at 159. See also supra text accompanying
note 20.
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regulating aspect of ERISA lies in its stated purpose "to protect
employees by requiring disclosure and reporting, setting forth
standards of conduct for fiduciaries, requiring vesting of
benefits, setting minimum standards of funding, and requiring
plan termination insurance." 2' The aspect of ERISA that seeks
to promote economic growth can be found in the preemption
clause. By including ERISA's preemption provision, Congress
also intended "to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be
subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to
minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying
with conflicting directives among States."" This reflects
Congress' intent to promote economic growth by minimizing
the burdens to employers and insurers in setting up employee
benefit plans.
Similarly, the FCLAA reflects these dual goals of
industry regulation and the promotion of economic growth. The
FCLAA was originally enacted in 1965 as a result of the
awareness that cigarette smoking posed a health threat.' The
Act's regulatory aspect can be found in its stated purpose to
adequately inform the public that cigarette smoking may be
hazardous to their health. 24 However, Congress was also
concerned about promoting economic growth and protecting the
national economy; thus, FCLAA allows tobacco companies to
avoid the burdens of complying with different state-mandated
warning labels.25 In sum, ERISA and the FCLAA share the
same dual purposes of protecting individuals through federal
regulation and promoting the national economy through
federal preemption of conflicting state laws. Given that the
decisions of both the tobacco industry and managed care
121 Kristen M. McCabe, The Texas Health Care Liability Act: Texas is the First
State to Listen to the Concerns of its Health Care Consumers, But How Much Has it
Heard? 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoLY 565, 571 (2000) (citation omitted).
22 Ingeroll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142 (1990).
2 Pennington v. Vistron, 876 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1989).
124 15 U.S.C § 1331 (1982) ("It is the policy of Congress... to establish a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising...
whereby- (1) The public may be adequately uninformed about any adverse health
effects of cigarette smoking.").25Pennington, 876 F.2d at 417.
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entities directly impact public health and the Congressional
purposes in enacting ERISA and FCLAA are so similar, the
Court's treatment of FCLAA preemption provides a useful
guide for viewing ERISA preemption of state tort law claims.
B. The Supreme Court's Treatment of FCLAA Preemption
Tobacco manufacturers have historically enjoyed civil
immunity from product liability."6 Since the 1950s, consumers
have been informed by the Surgeon General of the association
between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.' As a result,
Congress enacted the FCLAA in 1965 to regulate the cigarette
industry rather than prohibit smoking altogether. 8 The
FCLAA requires tobacco manufacturers to post one of several
specific labels on cigarette packages and advertisements
warning of the health risks associated with smoking. 9 Thus,
Congress assumed control of cigarette warnings and
advertising. In addition, the FCLAA included a preemption
provisions providing that "no statement relating to smoking
and health," other than required by the FCLAA, "shall be
required on any cigarette package.""°Although Congress
explicitly prohibited state laws relating to cigarette warnings,
state common law damage actions concerning the adequacy of
these warnings ensued. 3' The landmark decision, Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.,33 resolved this controversy.
126 Thornton, supra note 116, at 570 (citation omitted).
V7 Id. at 571 (citing Richard A. Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal
Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678, 680 (1966)). See Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith:
Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 440 (2000).
128 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982); see also Thornton, supra note 116, at
571. Congress amended certain provisions of the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act by the Pub. Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222,
84 Stat. 87 (1970), and again by the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984). Id. at n.40.
"
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1984).
I3O 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988).
13' Thornton, supra note 116, at 577.
132 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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In Cipollone, an action was brought against cigarette
manufacturers by the son of Rose Cipollone, who began
smoking in 1942 and died of lung cancer in 1984.33 The
petitioner claimed that the cigarette manufacturers breached
express warranties by failing to warn purchasers of the
hazards of smoking."3 The respondents' defense was that the
FCLAA and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969115 ("1969 Act"), preempted these state law claims."6
The Third Circuit held that a state law damage action
that challenged the propriety of a party's actions with respect
to the advertising of cigarettes was preempted by the 1969
Act.'37 On remand, the District Court, under the guide of the
Court of Appeals, found the claim of breach of express
warranty preempted.'38 The Supreme Court's decision marked
a significant change from the Court of Appeals decision
concerning FCLAA preemption. The Court held that with
respect to the 1965 FCLAA preemption provision, "Congress
spoke precisely and narrowly: 'No statement relating to
smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of
[properly labeled] cigarettes.' "139 The Court reasoned that this
provision on its face merely preempted positive laws
mandating further cautionary statements at both the state and
federal level."' In addition, the Court held that the preemption
provision must be read to include a presumption against the
preemption of state police power regulation.'4 Therefore, the
plaintiffs state common law claims were not preempted by the
FCLAA."2 However, the 1969 Act broadened the scope of
preemption. The Act's preemption provision provides that:
"No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
.. Id. at 508
" Id. In addition, he claimed fraudulent misrepresentation, failure to warn,
and conspiracy. Id.
'35 Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 88 (1970) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
1331-1340).
"'Id. at 508, 510.
137 Cipollone v. Liggett Gr., Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
'3' Cipollone v. Liggett Gr., Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986).
:39 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518 (quoting the FCLAA § 5 (b)).
1 Id. at 518.
4 Id.
4 Id. at 519-20.
'43 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520.
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shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter."1' Thus, the Court examined each of the plaintiffs
common law claims and asked "whether the legal duty that is
the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a
'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health...
imposed under State law with respect to . .. advertising or
promotion.' ,14
The most significant analysis, for the purpose of this
Note, is the claim of breach of express warranty46 because it
most resembles the claim of negligent adoption of benefits
policy by an HMO. In an action for breach of express warranty,
a plaintiff must allege a statement by the seller promising the
goods are all in a certain condition and that the goods do not
conform to the promised condition.47 In an action against an
HMO challenging the adoption of a benefits policy, a plaintiff
must allege that the adoption of the policy was negligent and
the damage sustained by the plaintiff was causally connected
to such adoption. The claims are similar because both are
grounded in state common law and are predicated on a
voluntarily action by the defendant entity. In order to be liable
for negligence of adoption of a benefits policy, an HMO must
first voluntarily adopt such a policy. Likewise, liability for
breach of express warranty stems from a manufacturer's claim
that their product purports to be something. This claim is also
voluntary on the part of the manufacturer.
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court found that a
manufacturer's liability for breach of express warranty would
not impose a requirement or prohibition based on state law
144 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
145 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334).
The claim of failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation by
neutralization of warnings were found to be preempted. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524,
527; see also Heather E. Kiasing, Federal Law Does Not Preempt Failure to Warn
Claims by Nonsmokers: Why Big Tobacco May Get Burned, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 119
(1998). The claim of fraudulent misrepresentation by false representation of material
fact or concealment was held not to be preempted. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529. In
addition, the claim of conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material facts was not
preempted. Id. at 530.
147 Kasing, supra note 146, at 130.
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because the requirement is imposed by the warrantor itself.148
A common law remedy for a voluntarily taken, contractual
commitment does not impose a requirement under state law.'49
Thus, the claim for breach of express warranty is not
preempted by the 1969 Act.
150
Following the Cipollone decision, federal district courts
have allowed the breach of express warranty claim to survive
preemption. In Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,5'
the Southern District of Texas found that the FCLAA did not
preempt the claim of breach of express warranty against
cigarette manufacturers because the claim was based on the
duty not to deceive rather than on duties based on smoking
and health.152 Similarly in Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
53
the Eastern District of Louisiana found that the claim of
breach of express warranty was not preempted by the FCLAA
for the reasons stated in Cipollone.54 These cases show that
after the Cipollone decision, the preemption defense was
sufficiently narrowed to allow recovery under the claim of
breach of express warranty against the tobacco industry.
As a result of the Supreme Court and other courts
allowing the claim of breach of express warranty to survive
FCLAA preemption, cigarette manufacturers may be held
directly liable for their breach. The Cipollone Court held that
since the duty that products conform to expressed warranties is
voluntarily assumed by the tobacco industry, it is not a
requirement imposed under state law. 5  Likewise, a
negligently-drawn policy implemented voluntarily by an HMO
should not be preempted by ERISA. A negligence claim
challenging an HMO's policy relates most directly to the
administration of the HMO, not to the employer's benefits
plan. The effect on the plan stems from voluntary action taken
by the HMO, adopting a policy to limit benefits. This voluntary
118 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525.149 Id. at 526.
"Id. at 527.
151 967 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
112 Id. at 928. In contrast, the court found that the plaintiffs claims of
conspiracy, fraud, and misrepresentation, and breach of implied warranties stem from
duties based on smoking and health and thus are preempted by the FCLAA.
13 870 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. La. 1994).
4 Id. at 1434.Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 526.
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action should result in HMO liability for negligence just as the
tobacco industry may be liable for its voluntary actions under
breach of express warranty.
CONCLUSION
Because of the prominence that managed care enjoys in
today's health care system, many Americans are affected by its
emphasis on containing health care costs. Although cutting
health care cost may be warranted, negligently furthering this
goal is unacceptable. To prevent such negligence in benefits
decisions, HMOs must be held accountable for their actions.
Because the presently enacted ERISA statute does not provide
an effective remedy against HMO negligence, consumers
should be able to bring a state tort law claim against HMOs.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to face the
question of H-MO liability for state tort law claims, its own
precedent in federal statutory preemption cases and decisions
of the Fifth Circuit provide a framework to allow such claims to
survive ERISA preemption. Furthermore, given the
similarities between the tobacco industry and managed care
entities, the Supreme Court's decision to allow breach of
express warranty claims to survive FCLAA preemption
provides a useful guideline for allowing state tort law claims
against HMOs to survive ERISA preemption.
Furthermore, there are sound policy reasons for
allowing a state law tort claim against an HMO to survive
ERISA preemption. First, none of the purposes that Congress
was trying to accomplish with ERISA would be furthered by
preempting this claim. An HMO would be subject to the same
basic common law in all states-that of liability for injuries
caused by negligence. So when an HMO adopts a multi-state
policy, it should do so in compliance with a general standard of
care. Thus, an HMO would not be subject to conflicting state
laws, which was one of the policy considerations behind ERISA
preemption.
In addition, the purpose of protecting employees' benefit
plans is furthered by allowing this cause of action. If HMOs are
not carefully adopting policies relating to their benefit plans,
then policyholders should be able to hold them liable. This will
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encourage HMOs to more carefully draft policies and ensure
that money spent on benefit plans is providing quality health
care. Thus, the ERISA objective of protecting employee benefit
plans is better furthered by holding HMOs liable for
negligently adopting their policies.
John W. Schuch'
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